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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Hobbs Act-An Amendment to the Federal
Anti-Racketeering Act
In United States v. Local 8071 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that it was not a violation of the Federal Anti-Racketeering
Act of 19342 for members of a union to stop trucks entering New York
City and by force and violence to compel payment of a day's wages to
a member of the union whether his offer to drive the truck was accepted
or refused.3 Mr. Justice Byrnes in writing the majority opinion said,
"This does not mean that such activities are beyond the reach of federal
legislative control."' 4 As a result, the Hobbs Bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives as an amendment to the Fedeial Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.8 It was generally recognized in Congress that the
Bill was inspired by the decision in United States v.Local 807.7 Although introduced as an amendment, it was the intent of the author of
the Hobbs Bill to "wipe out" the Act of 1934 and to substitute a new
act in its place.8 In spite of the opposition of labor leaders,9 the Hobbs
Bill became law on July 3, 1946.10
1United States v. Local 807 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of America, 315 U. S.521, 62 Sup. Ct. 642, 86
L. ed.. 1004 (1942). Local 807 and 26 individuals were also indicted for violation
of §1 of the Sherman Act. Conviction was reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the government did not seek review of this
part of the judgment. Notes (1942) 11 FORDEAm L. Rxv. 204, 41 Micn. L. REv.
338, 19 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 440, 16 TEMPLE L. Q. 329, 90 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 972.
148 STAT. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420a-e (Supp. 1945), "An Act to protect
trade and commerce against interference by violence, threats, coercion, or intimidation," approved June 18, 1934; held constitutional, Nick v. United States, 122
F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), 138 A. L. R. 791, 811 (1942), certioraridenied
314 U. S.687, 62 Sup. Ct. 302, 86 L. ed. 550.
' Evidence indicated that in several cases the defehdants either failed to offer
to work or refused to work for the money when asked to do so. U. S. v. Local
807, 315 U. S. 521, 526, 62 Sup. Ct. 642, 644, 86 L. ed. 1004, 1008 (1942).
'Id. at 536, 62 Sup. Ct. 648, 86 L. ed. 1012.
688 CONG. REC. 3101-2 (1942).
189 CoNG. REc. 3217 (1943).
89 CONG. R.Ec. 3201, 3217 (1943), 79 CONG. Ruc. December 11, 1945, at 12028,
79 CONG. REc. December 12, 1945, at 12085.
689 CoNG. REc. 3217 (1943), 79 CoNG. REC. December 12, 1945, at 12095.
* President William Green of the A. F. of L. urged the veto of the Hobbs Bill
as "dangerous legislation." Anerican Federation of Labor Weekly News Service,
Washington, D. C., June 25, 1946.
" U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Pub. L. No.
486, Title 1, §2-5 (July 3, 1946).
The legislative history of the Hobbs Act began on March 27, 1942, 88 CoNG.
REc. 3101-2 (1942) ; passed the House of Representatives April 92 1943, 89 CONG.
RE. 3230 (1943) ; bill was not .reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee;
next passed the House of Representatives on December 12, 1945, 79 CONG. REC.,
December 12, 1945 at 12106; became an amendment to the Case Bill on May 25,
1946, 79 CONG. REC., May 25, 1946 at 5837; vetoed as part of the Case Bill on
June 11, 1946, 79 CONG.'Ruc., June 11, 1946 at 6799; passed Senate as a separate
measure June 21, 1946, 79 CONG. REc., June 21, 1946 at 7384; signed by the President on July 3, 1946, 79 CoNG. REc., July 3, 1946 at 8487.
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The Hobbs Act provides that whoever conspires, attempts, commits
or threatens physical violence to any person or property, or in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion, shall be
guilty of a felony.
Robbery is defined in the Hobbs Act in substantially the same words
as those in the New York Penal Code" and extortion is defined in
almost identical words with those used in the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934.12 Title 1 (b), (c) provides:
The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of
personal property, from the person or in the presence of another,

against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence,
or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or
property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a

relative or member of his family or anyone in his company at the time
of the taking or obtaining.
The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threat-

ened force, violence,' 3 or fear, or under color of official right

Provisions in the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 designed to protect
legitimate activities of labor were eliminated by the Hobbs Act and a
safeguard for labor was provided in less extensive language. Instead
of the provisions in the former Act14 which stated that "payment of
wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee" were excluded
from the coverage of the Act, and that no court shall construe or apply
the provisions of the Act in such manner as "to impair, diminish, or in

any manner affect the rights of bona-fide labor organizations in lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed
in existing statutes of the United States," the Hobbs Act provides that
nothing in the Act shall be construed to repeal, modify, or affect either
the Sherman Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Railway Labor Act
15
or the National Labor Relations Act.
" The New York Penal Code defines robbery as "... the unlawful taking of
personal property, from the person or in the presence of another, against his will,
by means of force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person
or property, or the person or propety of a relative or member of his family, or
of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery." N. Y. PENAL CODE, §2120,
McKixNEY's CONSoL. LAWS OF N. Y., ANN., Book 39, Part 2, p. 533.
Congressman Hobbs gave as his reason for copying the New York definition of
robbery was that most of these "hold-ups" occurred there. 89 CONG. REc. 3226
(1943).
of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 is as follows: "Obtains the
1 §420a(b)
property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear,
or under color of official right!'; 48 STAT. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420a(b)
(Supp., 1945).
2"U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Public Law
486, Title 1, §1(b), (c).
"'48 STAT. 979 (1934) U. S. C. A. §420a-e (Supp., 1945).
1" Title II of the Hobbs Act is as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall be con-
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Will members of a labor union be subject to punishment under the
Hobbs Act for engaging in conduct similar to that of members of the
Teamsters' Union in United States v. Local 807 ?16 The decision in that
case relied on the legislative history 17 and the specific exemptions 8 of
the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934. The legislative history of the Hobbs
Act on the other hand clearly indicates an intent on the part of Congress to punish anyone committing the crimes of robbery and extortion
in interstate commerce whether or not in the course of labor activity. 19
The removal of both grounds on which the Supreme Court based its

holding that labor was exempt from prosecution under the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 makes it apparent that any attempt on the part of
members of a labor union to exact "wages" through force and violence
or threats thereof as was done in New York by the Teamsters' Union 20
will be punishable under the Hobbs Act.
Labor is apprehensive that the Hobbs Act holds the potential danger
of judicial misconstruction and that it is the first "Trojan horse" in a
campaign to weaken labor organizations. 2 ' Is the Hobbs Act anti-labor?
Is labor justified in assuming that the Hobbs Act is a threat to its right
to strike,22 boycott and picket peacefully23 for the obtainment of higher
strued to repeal, modify, or affect either section 6 or section 20 of an Act entitled
'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies,
and for other purposes,' approved October 15, 1914, or an Act entitled 'An Act to
amend the judicial code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts in
equity, and for other purposes,' approved March 23, 1932, or an Act entitled 'An
Act to provide for the prompt disposition of disputes between carriers and their
employees, and for other purposes,' approved May 20, 1926, as amended, or an
Act entitled 'An Act to diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate or foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations
Board, and for other purposes,' approved July 5, 1935." U. S. Code Congressional
Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Public Law 486 Title II (July 3, 1946).
U. S. v. Local 807, 315 U. S. 521, 62 Supp. Ct. 642, 86 L. ed. 1004 (1942).
1 U. S. v. Local 807, 315 U. S. 521, 528-530, 62 Sup. Ct. 642, 645, 86 L. ed.
1004, 1009 (1942).
" Id. at 535, 62 Sup. Ct. 647-8, 86 L. ed. 1012.
1989 CONG. Rxc. 3217, 3222 (1943), 79 CoNG. RFc., December 12, 1945 at
12085.
" In 1943 the Head of the Office of Defense Transportation reported that over
1,000 trucks a night were being held up and robbed in the various cities of the
United States and over 100 a day at the New York end of the Holland Tunnel.
Congressman Hobbs stated that he had received over 1,000 letters and telegrams
from farmers all over the country stating that the condition was worse in 1945
than it was in 1943. 79 CONG. REc., December 12, 1945, at 12095.
"189 CONG. REc. 3223 (1943), 79 CoNG. REc., December 12, 1945, at 12087.
Statement of Daniel J. Tobin, President of the International Brotherhood of

Teamsters (AFL) in American Federation of Labor Weekly News Service, Wash-

ington, D. C., June 25, 1946. See article by Joseph A. Padway, General Counsel
for the A. F. of L. in AMEIcAN FEDERATIoNIST, September, 1946, at 19-20.
2248 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. §151 et seq. (July 5, 1935), Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, provides: "Employees shall have the right to selforganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid and protection."
Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike."
" Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local No. 802, v. Wohl, 315 U. S.769,
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61
wages, better working conditions and other legal objectives? The
answer appears to be "No." The actual intent of Congress, 24 the express provisions in the Act itself, 25 and the unusual precaution on the
part of the President of the United States in placing before Congress
the Attorney General's construction of the Hobbs Act,26 all indicate an
improbability that any of the legitimate activities of labor will be made
criminal by judicial construction of the Act.
The full significance of the Hobbs Act, however, cannot be ascertained until our courts answer the following question: To what extent,
if any, does the Hobbs Act apply in situations in which labor employs its
legal weapons; i.e., a right to strike, boycott, and picket to obtain illegal
e2 7
objectives? In U. S. v. Compagna
a threat to strike for an unlawful
purpose was considered coercion within the meaning of the original
Anti-Racketeering Act. It follows that in order to determine whether
a strike is a legal economic weapon of labor or a wrongful use of concerted action it is first necessary to reach a conclusion as to the legality
of the objective achieved by the use of a strike.
Is it lawful for a labor union to strike or boycott an employer for
introducing labor saving devices in his business and thereby compel him
28
to retain or hire unnecessary workers? The authorities are in conflict
on this question. In U. S. v. Carrozo 9 a strike in which the employer
was given the choice of not using "truck cement mixers" or paying
unnecessary workers met with the approval of the court. This decision,
affirmed per curiam by the United States Supreme Court, 0 considered
in connection with the right of labor to strike for lawful objectives indicates that the Hobbs Act will not apply in a similar set of circumstances.
However, a different situation is presented in the case in which the
strike was fraught with violence and the union was successful in caus62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. ed. 1178 (1942) ; American Federation of Labor v. Swing,

312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. 855 (1940).
' 89 CONG. REc. 3218 (1943), 79 CONG. RF_., December 11, 1945, at 12024, 79
CONG.
REc., December 12, 1945, at 12085, 12089, 12095.
5
" U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6 at 405, Public Law
486, Title II (July 3, 1946).
"'President Truman approved the Hobbs Bill on the understanding that the

bill according to its language and legislative history "... . is not intended to deprive labor of any of its recognized rights, including the right to strike and picket,
and to take other legitimate and peaceful concerted action," 79 CONG. REc., July 3,

1946, at 8417.
'"United States v. Compagna, 146 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945), certiorari

denied, 324 U. S. 867, 65 Sup. Ct. 912-913, 89 L. ed. 1422 (1945).

' U. S. v. Carrozo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (E. D. Ill. 1941)
affrined per curiam in
U. S. v. International Hod Carriers & C. L. Dist. Council, 313 U. S. 539, 61

Sup. Ct. 839, 85 L. ed. 1508 (1941) ; but see Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed.

912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897). Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E.
(2d) 349 (1941), 136 A. L. R. 267, 282 (1942). Ludwig Teller, LABOR DispUTns
AND CoL"EcTIvE BARGAINING, I, §89.

S.
30"U.
Ibid.

v. Carrozo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (E. D. Ill. 1941).
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ing the employer to pay unnecessary workers. Should the employer
contend that he acceded to the demands of the union not from economic
coercion but solely because of fear of violence or damage to his property, it might be shown that the "stand-by" workers who took money
from the employer in the form of wages were guilty of ".

.

. obtaining

property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence or fear.. ."81 and therefore subject
to be prosecuted for extortion as defined in the Hobbs Act.
A threat to strike or a strike for the purpose of requiring an employer to pay a fine to the union for violating a union agreement has been
held illegal.3 2 Peaceful picketing has been enjoined"8 because the objective, which was to persuade the employer to pay the union initiation
dues for non-union employees, was considered illegal. If unlawful objectives make a strike or picketing for those objectives a wrongful use
of concerted action, the fact that an employer in these situations was
thus deprived of his property might invoke the provisions of the Hobbs
Act.
Labor leaders who use their position in the union to threaten "labor
trouble" for the purpose of extorting fees 4 from an employer may be
subject to prosecution under the Hobbs Act. Racketeering of this type
was punishable under the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.85 Conviction
could be had even though the labor leader had a dual motive of improving the wages of the union members as well as extracting fees to
feather his own nest.80
The sit-down strike presents a different problem. The question of
the illegality of the objective is not material; instead, the illegality of
the strike itself becomes important. The sit-down strike has been dedared illegal a7 But would the participants in a sit-down strike be
subject to prosecution under the Hobbs Act? In Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader"5 both employees and non-employees of the plant owner forcibly
*' U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Public Law
486, Title 1, §1(c) (July 3, 1946).
" People v. Seefeldt, 310 Ill. 441, 141 N. E. 829 (1923) ; State v. Dalton, 134
Mo. App. 517, 114 S. W. 1132 (1908); People v. Barondess, 133 N. Y. 649, 31

N. E. 240 (1882).
" Silkworth ef al. v. Local No. 575"of American Federation of Labor, 309
Mich. 746, 16 N. W. (2d) 145 (1944S.'1, U. S. v. Lanza, 85 F. (2d) 544. (C.'C. A. 2nd, 1936) certiorari denied, 299
U. S. 609, 57 Sup. Ct. 235, 81 L. ed. 449. See Note (1937) Legislation: Leaal
Implications of Labor Racketeering, 37 COL. L. REv. 993.
"Nick v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), U. S. v. Compagna, 146 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945), certiorari denied, 324 U. S. 867,
65 Sup. Ct. 912-913, 89 L. ed. 1422 (1945).
3' Nick v. United States, cited supra note 35, at 669, 670, 138 A. L. R. at 804.
37 N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U. S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct.
490, 83 L. ed. 627, 123 A. L. R. 599 (1939). Because the strike was "unlawful"
certain of the strikers lost the right to reinstatement with back pay which had
been awarded them by the National Labor Relations Board.
"Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 84 L. ed. 1311,
128 A. L. R. 1044, 1075 (1940).
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seized the plant and did considerable damage to the property and
machinery. The effort of the owner to recover his damages by prosecution under the Sherman Act -" was unsuccessful. Whether another
wave of sit-down strikes would produce indictments, where interstate
commerce is affected, under the Hobbs Act is a matter of conjecture.
Might not the owner's loss of use of his property or its destruction, by
a sit-down strike, bring the case within the robbery or extortion provisions of the Hobbs Act?
The Antitrust Division, U. S. Department of Justice, for several
years has considered the wrongful use of strikes, boycotts and threats
thereof for the purpose of requiring payment of wages to "stand-by"
workers when labor saving devices are used, 40 forcing the hiring of
useless workers, 41 preventing the use of cheaper material, or enforcing
illegally fixed prices4" as unlawful and subject to prosecution under the
Sherman Act." A series of recent decisions 45 by the United States
Supreme Court have virtually given labor immunity from prosecution
under the Sherman Act. In Allen Bradley Company v. Local No. 3,
Justice Black said:
"Our holding means that the same labor union activities may or
may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, depending upon whether
the union acts alone or in combinations with business groups. This, it
is argued, brings about a wholly undesirable result-one which leaves
labor unions free to engage in conduct which restricts trade. But
the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is a question for
the determination of Congress." 40
Now that many activities of labor which the Antitrust Division con-

"Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq. as
amended.
"Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on
H. R. 5218, H. R. 6752, H. R. 6872 and H. R. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)
408.
"IId. at 403.
"Miller, Antitrust Labor Problems: Law and Policy (1940) 7 LAw & CoxTEmp. PRoB. 82, 89.
']lbid.
"Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "Every contract, combination

in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Act of
July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq., as amended.
"Hunt v. Crumbach, 325 U. S.821, 65 Sup. Ct. 1545, 89 L. ed. 1954 (1945);
Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 3,325 U. S. 797, 65 Sup. Ct. 1533,
89-L. ed. 1441 (1945) ; U. S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S.219, 61 Sup. Ct. 463, 85 L.
ed. 788 (1941) ; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S.469, 60 Sup. Ct.- 982, 84
L. ed. 1311, 128 A. L. R. 1044 (1940). See Notes (1946) 19 Csav. L. Rv.256
and (1941) 50 YA!,E L. J. 787.
",Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S.797, 809-810, 65
Sup. Ct. 1533, 1540, 89 L. ed. 1939, 1948 (1945). See Philadelphia Record Co. v.
Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n of Philadelphia et -al.,
155 F. (2d) 799
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1946). Labor union was enjoined from combining with a business
association to prevent the plaintiff from producing photo-engraving products at
night. Combination was declared to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
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siders illegal cannot be prosecuted under the Sherman Act, the Hobbs
Act may acquire a greater significance than it would have otherwise.
It may be that henceforth the predominant question to arise in an
analysis of the wrongful activities of labor will no longer be whether
or not there was a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, but rather
whether or not there was robbery or extortion in interstate commerce
as defined in the Hobbs Act.
WMLIAM B. AYcocK.
Aviation-Liability of Airport for Low Flying-Flights Through
Airspace as Taking of an Easement
With the end of World War II, there has been a great advance in
the field of commercial aviation both on a national and international scale.
This in turn will bring about an increasing amount of litigation over
problems incident to air commerce, and result in further development of
a body of law peculiar to this type of commerce.
A case of interest in this field was recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court,1 and although the case arose out of facts created
by war conditions, the decision is significant as our highest court's first
holding on a problem which will be present as long as we have airports
and aircraft. That problem is the proper adjustment of the conflicting
rights of adjacent landowners and airport operators.
This particular case was an action by one Causby against the United
States for an alleged taking by the defendant of the plaintiff's home
and chicken farm which was adjacent to the Greensboro, North Carolina, municipal airport, leased by the defendant for use as an Army and
Navy air base. The taking complained of was caused by frequent flights
of government aircraft at low altitudes while taking off and landing.
The noise of the planes, and the glare of the landing lights at night
made it impossible to use the land as a chicken farm, and the Court of
Claims found that the plaintiff's property had depreciated in value as a
result of this, and held that the United States had taken an easement
in the airspace from the commencement of the lease, the value of which
was $2,000.00.2 The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Claims as
to the taking of an easement for which plaintiff should be compensated,3 but reversed the case in order that the nature of the easement
I United States v. Causby, 326 U. S. -,
66 Sup. Ct. 1062, 90 L. ed. 971
(1946). (Justices Black and Burton dissenting.)

'Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945).

(Judge Madden

dissenting.)

This was not a taking of an easement by prescription, but an implied taking
giving rise to a suit under the Tucker Act [24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C.
§250(1) (1940)] which gives jurisdiction to the Court of Claims for actions against
the United States ". . . founded upon the Constitution of the United States, .
not sounding in tort. . . ." However, it would seem possible in the light of this

